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Wills, Trusts and Administration
of Estates
by James C. Rehberg*
The most recent survey period included considerably more judicial
than legislative activity affecting fiduciary law, perhaps attesting to the
relative stability of fiduciary law. Notwithstanding this relative
stability, the issues raised in the cases ranged all the way from those of
venue and jurisdiction to a case about the construction of a will probated
in a now long closed estate.
While there was little substantive legislation in the area of fiduciary
law, there were a few such statutes. One of these expanded upon the
guardian and ward relationship, and another authorized the use of the
"Financial Power of Attorney." These legislative developments will be
discussed in the last section of this Article.
I.

A.

RECENT DECISIONS--WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

PreliminaryIssues

Jurisdiction and Venue. While issues of jurisdiction and venue do
not often arise, we start this discussion with two recent cases which
illustrate their fundamental importance. In In re Estate of Adamson,'
the duly qualified executor of the estate of a decedent demanded that the
surviving wife turn over to him two vehicles that were being held by the
wife but were titled in the name of the decedent. When she refused,
claiming an ownership interest in the vehicles, the probate court found
her in contempt of court. The court of appeals, however, reversed this
finding, holding that the probate court in Georgia lacks jurisdiction to
* Professor Emeritus, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Mercer
University (A.B., 1940; J.D., 1948); Duke University (LL.M., 1952). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. 215 Ga. App. 613, 451 S.E.2d 501 (1994).
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try title.2 It is given jurisdiction only over "property belonging to" a
decedent's estate.3 The executor's contention that he was claiming only
the right to possession of the vehicles begged the question. The probate
court's total lack of jurisdiction over the vehicles thus rendered the
award to the executor a void judgment, the violation of which would not
be contemptuous.4
While the county of residence of a testator at his death gives probate
jurisdiction to the probate court of that county,5 removal to another
county is specifically authorized under certain circumstances. 6 Rentz v.
Blanton7 necessitated construction of that removal statute.8 In Rentz
the decedent's will was admitted to probate in Wayne County, her place
of residence, and her son was duly qualified as executor. A few months
later he petitioned the Probate Court of Wayne County for removal of
the proceeding to the Probate Court of Appling County, the county of his
residence. The court of appeals reversed the probate court's denial of the
transfer. The problem was solely one of construction of the cited code
section.9 The heirs' resistance to the removal could have been based
upon the fact that the section starts with the statement that removal
"may" be done by the filing of certain documents in the probate court of
the county to which removal is sought. Whether or not the heirs made
the possible argument that the word "may" suggests that removal is
discretionary, their express argument was that such removal would
allow the executor to avoid the rulings of the original court. ° The
court of appeals disposed of this argument by noting that in the case of
such a removal the court to which the case was transferred would have
"the record from the transferring court and would have the authority to
reissue any orders which remained pending at the time of transfer."11
Georgia's Slayer Statutes. Slayer statutes are premised on the
notion that killers should not be allowed to profit as a direct result of
their crimes. Georgia's slayer statute 12 promotes this public policy by
providing that property which would have gone to the slayer will go,

2. Id. at 613-14, 451 S.E.2d at 501.
3. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30(a)(4) (1995).
4. 215 Ga. App. at 614, 451 S.E.2d at 502.

5. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-1(b) (1995).
6. Id. § 53-7-120(a).
7. 216 Ga. App. 396, 454 S.E.2d 606 (1995).

8. O.C.G.A. § 53-7-120 (1995).
9. Id.
10. 216 Ga. App. at 397, 454 S.E.2d at 607.
11. Id. (referring to Uniform Transfer Rule T-13 and O.C.G.A. § 53-7-120(a)(1) (1995)).
12. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-6 (1995).
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instead, to such other heirs of the victim as would be dntitled thereto
under the rules of descent and distribution "or by will, deed or other
conveyance" executed by the victim."3 Bradley v. Bradley4 applied
this statute to an unusual factual situation. There the testator was
survived by his two sons as his only lineal descendants. His will, which
was apparently well thought out, left his son James only a hundred
dollars because James had previously received an advance on his
inheritance in a certain land deal. The balance of the estate was left to
his other son Benjamin, with the provision that if Benjamin was not
alive at the time of the testator's death and had no issue, his share
would go to four named alternative beneficiaries.'"
Later the testator was wrongfully killed by his son, Benjamin. Neither
James nor Benjamin contended that Benjamin should be able to take
under the will. James's argument, though, was that because Benjamin
killed their father, the slayer statute must be applied to Benjamin's
share of the estate, removing that share from the operation of the will
and, instead, passing it through the laws of intestacy to him. The court
of appeals, however, gave the slayer statute full operation; i.e., Benjamin
and his heirs (he had no issue) were barred from taking by the very
terms of the statute.'6 James could not take because the will limited
his claim to the hundred dollar legacy and therefore, the balance of the
estate passed to the four alternative beneficiaries."
Georgia's insurance code also has a slayer statute comparable to the
one just discussed." It denies any benefits under a life insurance
policy to one who kills the insured and who is named as a beneficiary in
the policy.' 9 In Stephens v. Adkins,"° the insured named as equal
beneficiaries of his policy his son and his daughter. The son was later
convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of his father. In a declaratory
judgment action brought by the daughter, individually and as administratrix, the son offered an affidavit in defense that the killing was an
accident or in the alternative, was in self-defense. The court of appeals
affirmed the grant of a summary judgment that the son was not entitled
to any portion of the insurance proceeds." The son's conclusory
statements in the affidavit did not affect the judgment that the son was
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
213 Ga. App. 68, 443 S.E.2d 863 (1994).
Id. at 69, 443 S.E.2d at 864.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-4-6(a) (1995)).
Id., 443 S.E.2d at 865.

18. O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13 (1995).
19. Id.
20. 214 Ga. App. 653, 448 S.E.2d 734 (1994).
21. Id. at 653-54, 448 S.E.2d at 734-35.
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guilty of the voluntary manslaughter. He remained convicted of the
crime which, under the terms of the slayer statute applicable to
insurance, precludes a slayer 22
from taking as beneficiary under a life
insurance policy on the victim.

Year's Support. While the year's support claim of the surviving
spouse is given precedence over any other claim against a decedent's
estate, an exception exists in favor of a "perfected security interest"
in property covered by Georgia's Uniform Commercial Code.24 Auto
Alignment Services v. Bray25 necessitated a reconciliation of these two
sections. In that case, after the husband's death, his wife was awarded
year's support in assets which included nine hundred shares of stock
then in the possession of the defendant corporation, allegedly as security
for a loan made by the corporation to the decedent. After the wife's
subsequent death her executors brought a trover action for the stock.
The defendant corporation claimed that it had a perfected security
interest in the stock which gave it priority.26
The trial court held that the defendant's failure to assert its claim in
the year's support action amounted to a waiver of its lien.27 Furthermore, even if defendant had a perfected security interest, by not
asserting it until the time of the trover action amounted to an impermissible collateral attack upon the year's support judgment.2 The court
of appeals affirmed the judgment on the following, quite different
reasoning: the pledge of stock as collateral does not change ownership,
it creates only a lien. Since the wife became owner of the stock by virtue
of the year's support award, the only remaining question was whether
the defendant's lien was extinguished by that award. It would not have
been extinguished if the defendant had acquired a perfected security
interest prior to the decedent's death. Here, though, the defendant failed
to show such an interest. In order to perfect a security interest in
corporate stock, the stock certificate must be delivered to the secured
party, accompanied by a stock pledge agreement.2 9 While in this case
a security agreement was alluded to in the defendant's corporate records,
which were a part of the record on appeal, the agreement itself was not.

22.

Id. at 654, 448 S.E.2d at 734.

23. 214 Ga. App. 53, 446 S.E.2d 753 (1994) (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-7-91 (1994)).
24. See O.C.G.A. § 11-9-310 (1994).
25.

214 Ga. App. 53, 446 S.E.2d 753 (1994).

26. Id. at 53, 446 S.E.2d at 753.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 54, 446 S.E.2d at 754.
29. Id., 446 S.E.2d at 755. See O.C.G.A. § 11-9-310 (1944), as to priority of liens, and
§ 11-9-203 (1944), as to attachment and enforceability.
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Hence, there was no evidence that a perfected security interest
existed.30
B.

Proof of Heirship

The problems faced by one born out of wedlock who attempts to prove
a right to inherit property from his father have always been burdensome, if not impossible ones. Three recent cases attest to this statement:
Pinkard v. Morris,31 In Re Estate of Burton, 2 and Welch v. Welch. 3
In Pinkard v. Morris,3 4 the plaintiff was born five months after her
mother married Hight, who was not plaintiff's father but, instead, was
one whom her mother later married, she said, "to give a name to her
daughter." 5 Eighteen months later the mother, then only sixteen years
of age, filed for a divorce from Hight, alleging in her petition that there
had been one child "born as the issue of this marriage." 6 In her
deposition the sixteen year old mother stated that she did not recall ever
reading the petition, which she said she signed at the request of her
attorney. The divorce decree provided for custody, visitation rights, and
support for "the parties' minor child" (the plaintiff).3 7 Hight never paid
any support for plaintiff. The mother stated that she never attempted
to enforce the decree because she did not believe that Hight owed them
anything, and her only interest was in the divorce decree."
Here a decedent appeared on the scene. One Morris died intestate in
1992 and the plaintiff filed a claim that she was Morris's daughter and
therefore entitled to share as an heir. The trial court entered summary
judgment for the estate of Morris, holding that plaintiff's claim was
barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the prior divorce
decree in favor of plaintiff's mother established that Hight, not the
decedent Morris, was her natural father.39
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the facts failed to show
that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from claiming as an heir of
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes
decedent Morris.4"
adjudication of an issue previously adjudicated between the parties or

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

214 Ga. App. at 55, 448 S.E.2d at 755.
215 Ga. App. 297, 450 S.E,2d 330 (1994).
265 Ga. 122, 453 S.E.2d 16 (1995).
265 Ga. 89, 453 S.E.2d 445 (1995).
215 Ga. App. 297, 450 S.E.2d 330 (1994).
Id. at 298, 450 S.E.2d at 331.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 299, 450 S.E.2d at 331.
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their privies."' Privity connotes that the interests of the party to an
action must fully represent the interests of the privy and must be fully
congruent with those interests.42 Such privity did not exist in this case;
hence, the plaintiff is not estopped from asserting her claim as an heir
of Morris. 43 The plaintiff was a mere infant, relying solely upon her
mother to protect her interest in the mother's divorce proceeding. The
record showed that the mother's only concern was in getting a divorce.
She did not care enough for the plaintiff's rights to even read the
petition or to enforce the support decree, which Hight failed to pay. It
follows that the interests of the plaintiff were simply not represented in
the divorce proceeding. Consequently, she is not collaterally estopped
from claiming as an heir of Morris."
The problem of proof of heirship reached the supreme court in two
cases, one of them involving a claim of virtual legitimation and the other
a claim of virtual adoption.45 In In re Estate of Burton,6 the plaintiff,
claiming to be the out of wedlock but virtually legitimated son and sole
heir of the intestate decedent, filed for letters of administration. The
claim was contested by the decedents brother.47 The concept of virtual
legitimation was first fully recognized in Prince v. Black 4' and was
subsequently codified.49 It recognizes that an out of wedlock child can
inherit from its father by establishing with clear and convincing
evidence that it is the child of the intestate father and that the latter
intended that the child share in the father's estate.50 So, in every such
case, the burden is on the claimant to produce clear and convincing
evidence. The probate court's grant of letters of administration to the
child was reversed by the supreme court, which, after reviewing the
evidence, concluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet the clear and
convincing test.5'
The supreme court review of the evidence will be helpful in resolving
such cases in the future. It pointed out that evidence in Burton was
uncontroverted that the decedent had no contact with the plaintiff
during the first twenty years of the plaintiff's life, and it was the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 298, 450 S.E.2d at 331 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (1993)).
Id. (citing Miller v. Charles, 211 Ga. App. 386, 439 S.E.2d 88 (1993)).
Id., 450 S.E.2d at 332.
Id.
265 Ga. 122, 453 S.E.2d 16 (1995); 265 Ga. 89, 453 S.E.2d 445 (1995).
265 Ga. 122, 453 S.E.2d 16.

47. Id. at 122-23, 453 S.E.2d at 16.
48.
49.
50.
51.

256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986).
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(c)(1)(E) (1995).
Id.
265 Ga. at 123, 453 S.E.2d at 16.
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plaintiff who initiated contact. While the plaintiff and his family
testified that the decedent acknowledged him as his son and never
charged him for meals at decedent's restaurant, the brother of the
decedent, along with other members of his family, testified that the
decedent never mentioned having a son. Although one witness, an
employee of the decedent, testified that the decedent introduced the
plaintiff as his son, another employee testified that the decedent would
claim plaintiff as his child on one occasion and vehemently deny it on
another. Still another witness testified that the decedent said publicly
he was childless. All the witnesses agreed that the decedent had often
said that he did not care what happened to his property after his
death. 2 The supreme court emphasized that the evidence of paternity
was much more compelling in Prince v. Black,53 where the decedent
cared for the child from the age of six months, named him as insurance
beneficiary, and swore under penalty of perjury that the child was his
son." Perhaps, over time, there will be other cases such as Prince u.
Black55 and Burton5" directly addressing the issue of clear and convincing evidence and giving us a more precise understanding of the
meaning of the term.
The other case of disputed heirship was Welch v. Welch,57 in which
the claimed right to inherit was based upon the theory of a virtual
adoption, not on that of virtual legitimation. Ajuvenile court had placed
the claimants in the custody of the Welches in the 1960s. Although they
remained in such custody until they reached majority, the Welches never
initiated any proceedings to adopt them formally. After both Mr. and
Mrs. Welch died intestate in 1992, the children filed an action claiming
children's shares of their estates. In recognition of the fact that a claim
of virtual adoption must be based upon a contract,5 8 the plaintiffs asked
the court in effect to create a contract out of the juvenile court's order
establishing legal custody in the Welches and giving them authority to
proceed with statutory adoption if they so chose.59
In a four to three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the claims, relying upon the recent case of O'Neal v.

52. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 17.
53. 256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986).
54. 265 Ga. at 124, 453 S.E.2d at 17.
55. 265 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986).
56. 265 Ga. 122, 453 S.E.2d 161 (1995).
57. 265 Ga. 89, 453 S.E.2d 445 (1995).
58. Id. at 91, 453 S.E.2d at 477 (citing O'Neal v. Wilkes, 263 Ga. 853, 439 S.E.2d 490
(1994)). See Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276, 236 S.E.2d 624 (1977); D.H. REDFEARN,
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN GEORGIA § 371 (5th ed. 1988).
59. 265 Ga. at 89, 453 S.E.2d at 446.
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Wilkes,"0 which held that in a virtual adoption case a contract for
adoption must be proven to have been entered into by persons competent
to contract for the disposition of the child."' Ordinarily such a contract
would be one between the natural parents and the adopting parents.
The supreme court held that the juvenile court order granting custody
to the Welches should not be expanded into a contract of virtual
adoption.6 2 While the court had authority to approve the custodians'
proceeding with a statutory adoption, the custodians never took such
steps.63
C. Probate of Will
Undue Influence and Lack of Testamentary Capacity. Undue
influence and lack of testamentary capacity are frequently raised
grounds for a caveat of a will. Since they are incapable of precise
definition, the cases litigating them are good examples of how the courts
determine whether the cumulative effect of the evidence is sufficient to
establish either of these grounds. Two recent cases addressed this
specific point.64 The executor named in the will challenged in McGee
v. Ingram"6 was also the principal beneficiary. In support of his motion
for summary judgment, he produced the testimony of three witnesses:
the attorney who drafted the will, the physician who treated the
testatrix for eight years prior to her death, and another witness. The
attorney testified that immediately prior to execution he reviewed the
will, page by page, with the testatrix and that he specifically asked her
if she had been subjected to any undue influence and if the terms of the
will expressed her wishes. He testified that the testatrix denied that
there had been any undue influence and affirmed that it was in fact her
will. The physician testified that, in his opinion, the testatrix was not
one who would let herself be unduly influenced. Furthermore, when he
asked her if she knew what she was doing and66if she agreed with the
terms of the will, she replied in the affirmative.
In opposition the caveator offered evidence that the executor, the
principal beneficiary, had for years occupied a confidential relationship
with the testatrix. On appeal from the probate court's admitting of the

60. 263 Ga. 850, 439 S.E.2d 490 (1994).
61. Id. at 851, 439 S.E.2d at 491.
62. 265 Ga. at 90, 453 S.E.2d at 447.
63. Id.
64. McGee v. Ingram, 264 Ga. 649, 448 S.E.2d 439 (1994); Sims v. Sims, 265 Ga. 55,
452 S.E.2d 761 (1995).
65. 264 Ga. 649, 448 S.E.2d 439 (1994).
66. Id. at 650, 448 S.E.2d at 440.
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will to probate, the court granted the executor's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of undue influence, but denied the issue of
testamentary capacity.6" The supreme court affirmed the issue of
undue influence, but reversed the issue of testamentary capacity.
There was no evidence in the record rebutting the testimony of the three
attesting witnesses as to testatrix's capacity. The fact that the executor
was the primary beneficiary and was also in a confidential relationship
with the testatrix did not alone establish any undue influence. On the
other hand, the affidavits of lay witnesses on the issue of testamentary
capacity, construed most favorably to the caveators, were sufficient to
raise the issue of capacity. Other affidavits of physicians, based on the
testatrix's medical records which were not of record in superior court
(though they were in probate court), lacked probative value, thus leaving
unresolved the issue of capacity.69
Sims v. Sims 7 ° makes the point that influence of a testator in the

drafting of a will and in its execution is not, in itself, bad or unlawful.
Only when the influence constrains or coerces the testator to do what
"his best judgment -tells him not to do" is it considered undue influence. 71 The result is that the will of the influencer is substituted for
that of the testator. Elaborating on this basic premise, the court looked
carefully at the three points on which the testator's grandchildren relied,
in order to prevail in probate court. 2
First, the grandchildren offered evidence that the testator's children
requested the testator obtain a prenuptial agreement before his second
marriage in order to protect the family business and other assets
acquired by him during the forty-five years of marriage to his first wife.
Second, they offered evidence of his transfer of assets (five years after
the execution of the will and two years after the execution of the codicil),
for about one-half their value, from one corporation owned by him to
another one owned by family members. Third, they alleged that one of
the executors had mismanaged the estate of a deceased brother.
Opposing evidence was then offered, showing that the testator, though
he had retired, continued to exercise active control of his business

67.
68.

Id. at 649, 448 S.E.2d at 440.
Id. at 651-52, 448 S.E.2d at 441.

69. Id.
70. 265 Ga. 55, 452 S.E.2d 761 (1995).
71. Id., 452 S.E.2d 762 (citing D.H. REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
IN GEORGIA § 50 (5th ed. 1988)).
72. Id.
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affairs. There was also evidence of mutual influence between the
testator and his sons.73
Notwithstanding the probate court's finding that there was undue
influence, the supreme court reversed, holding that as a matter of law
the total evidence precluded such a finding.74 The evidence offered by
the caveators failed to show any substitution of the will of the influencers for that of the testator.75
Ademption. The issue of ademption of a devise reached the supreme
court in an unusual manner in In re Estate of Corbitt.7 8 When the will
was offered for probate by the surviving wife, the named executor, the
testator's two children by a previous marriage filed a caveat on the
ground that a devise to the wife had been adeemed by a prior conveyance of the land. Furthermore, they contended that the wife was
estopped from claiming under the will by a reconciliation settlement
agreement executed by the testator and the wife, pursuant to which the
testator conveyed to her certain land. Pursuant to an "Appeal by
Agreement" the superior court, after a pre-trial stipulation of the parties
as to the validity of the will, denied the wife's motion for summary
judgment.7 7
On appeal, the supreme court held that the superior court should have
ordered summary judgment for the wife.7" The only inquiry in a
probate proceeding is that of devisavit vel non.79 Consequently, the only
issues were the legal execution of the will, the testamentary capacity of
the testator, and the presence or absence of undue influence, fraud, or
mistake in the execution of the will.8 ° Since the probate court in such
a proceeding merely adjudicates the factum of the will, the superior
court on appeal is similarly limited. 8' It follows that the effect of the
invalidity of a bequest, or of the ademption thereof, would be only to
render the bequest void, not to invalidate the will. Having stipulated
to
82
the validity of the will, there remained no valid ground for caveat.

73. Id. at 56-57, 452 S.E.2d at 763-64.
74. Id. at 56, 452 S.E.2d at 762.
75. Id. at 56-57, 452 S.E.2d at 763.
76. 265 Ga. 110, 454 S.E.2d 129 (1995).
77. Id. at 110, 454 S.E.2d at 129.
78. Id. at 111, 454 S.E.2d at 130.
79. Id., 454 S.E.2d at 129.
80. Id. at 110, 454 S.E.2d at 129.
81. Id., 454 S.E.2d at 130 (citing Thomas v. Roughton, 227 Ga. 127, 179 S.E.2d 62
(1971)).
82. Id. at 110-11, 454 S.E.2d at 130.
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The court noted, however, that the children are not without a
remedy.8 3 They may, in a separate proceeding, challenge the validity
of the devise itself, claim that there has been an ademption, or argue
that the wife is estopped to claim the land. None of these points are
relevant, though, in a proceeding in which the only issue is that of
devisavit vel non. 4
Revocation. The will in Wells v. Jackson 5 was caveated on the
ground that it had been revoked by "obvious erasures" in the names of
two residuary takers. While there were apparent water smudges on
these names, they remained clearly legible. In its opinion upholding the
will, the supreme court reviewed the initial burden of proof and the
shifting of it in will contests, noting two points. First, the propounder
has the burden of proof regarding compliance with the technical
requirements of the wills act, such as capacity and the free and
voluntary action on the part of the testator. Second, when the propounder has thus made out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
caveator to prove that the will is invalid.86 Here the court found that
the caveator failed. 7 Even if the smudges had been made by the
testator, they still were no more than an unsuccessful attempt to revoke
by obliteration. Every word of the will remained clearly legible and
therefore there was no evidence that an obliteration or cancellation
occurred. 8
D. TRusts
Purchase Money Resulting Trusts. The first of the two trust
cases to be discussed in this section, Thompson v. Beardon,"9 calls us
back to the fundamental logic of the purchase money resulting trust.
The evidence in this case showed that at an unspecified date, a small
parcel of land was conveyed for $5,500 to a husband and wife. They
paid $2,500 down and agreed to pay the balance in monthly installments
of forty dollars each. Thereafter, the husband's brother, who lived with
the couple on the land, paid the monthly installments of forty dollars
until the full purchase price was paid. Thirty years after they had

83. Id. at 111, 454 S.E.2d at 130.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
265 Ga. 181, 451 S.E.2d 690 (1995).
Id. at 182, 451 S.E.2d at 691-92.
Id. at 183, 451 S.E.2d at 692.
Id.
265 Ga. 16, 453 S.E.2d 20 (1995).
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purchased the property, the husband and wife died intestate. The
brother then asserted his claim that his monthly payments on the
purchase price established an implied trust in his favor; hence, the
a
property was his.9" The supreme court had no difficulty
91 reversing
jury verdict which had awarded the land to the brother.
The undisputed evidence showed that the brother had neither paid nor
obligated himself to pay any part of the $2,500 down payment made at
the time of the conveyance.92 To establish a claim to a purchase money
resulting trust, it must be established that all, or at least a specified
portion, of the purchase price was paid by the claimant at or before the
time of the conveyance of title to the alleged resulting trustee. 9"
In the other trust case, Jordan v. Caswell,"4 the court, in a two-page
opinion, dealt with issues of fraudulent conveyances, discretionary
trusts, spendthrift trusts, and the applicability of Georgia's new trust
code to trusts created prior to its enactment.95 The plaintiff in this
case had recovered a judgment in 1987 against a husband and wife and
had later received partial payment of it by settling his proof of claim in
the wife's then pending Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Then, in
1991, twelve days before her death, the wife executed the will involved
in this litigation. In it she created a discretionary trust containing the
bulk of her estate which had four results. First, it provided for the
support of her husband; second, it named her husband and their son as
trustees. Third, it gave her husband during his life the power to give his
interest to the wife's heirs. Fourth, her husband was required to devise
the property at his death to the wife's heirs as he determined.
Furthermore, the trust also provided that the husband should have no
power to appoint the property to himself, his estate, his creditors, or
creditors of his estate, and that his interest in the trust would not be
subject to claims of his creditors.9 6
The judgment creditor, whose claim had been only partially satisfied
in the wife's Chapter 11 proceeding, sued to have the trust created in

90.

Id. at 16-17, 453 S.E.2d at 20.

91. Id. at 17, 453 S.E.2d at 21.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Loggins v. Daves, 201 Ga. 628, 40 S.E.2d 520 (1946)). That this is long
established trust law, though, is shown by BOGERT, TRUST § 74 (6th ed. 1987). As a matter
of fact, this traditional requirement is implicit in O.C.G.A. § 53-12-92 (1995), which defines
such a trust as a resulting trust implied for the benefit of one "payingconsideration for the
transfer." Id. (emphasis added).
94. 264 Ga. 638, 450 S.E.2d 818 (1994).
95. Id. at 638-39, 450 S.E.2d at 819-20.
96. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 819.
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her will declared void.97 In his petition, he alleged that the transfer
was a fraudulent one under Georgia's fraudulent conveyance statute98
and that he was entitled to have the court use its equitable powers to
declare the trust void.9 9 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
holding that the trust was valid and not a fraudulent transfer. In his
verified complaint, the plaintiff alleged a fraudulent transfer and he also
averred that the wife had been released from further liability by the
subsequent agreement in the bankruptcy court. In light of this
admission in judicio that the wife was no longer his debtor, her creation
of the testamentary trust was not the act of a debtor under the
fraudulent conveyance statute.'
Nor did the spendthrift trust provision leave the husband's claim
under the wife's will open to attack.'1 1 The Georgia Trust Act specifically authorizes spendthrift trusts,' 2 but an apparent problem was
posed by the fact that the act became effective a few months after the
creation of the trust in this case.'0 3 The plaintiff argued that to apply
it to him would deprive him of vested rights, but the court held that he
failed to identify any such rights that he would lose. ' In elaboration,
the court explained that the plaintiff was a judgment creditor of the
husband when the trust was created and, as such, had a right to assert
a claim to any money coming into the husband's possession.' 5 That
is a right which the plaintiff still has.' 6 While he could have made a
claim against the corpus of the trust during the months between its
creation and the enactment of the Georgia Trust Act, he failed to assert
such claim. When he did make the claim, the Georgia Trust Act had
become effective, including the provision that the act applied to existing
trusts unless "it would impair vested rights.' 0 °
The plaintiff still has the right to proceed against distributions from
the trust to the husband, but he is not now entitled to any form of
equitable relief. The difficulty with his claim against the husband is
that the husband is currently entitled only to support out of the trust,
a right which is not subject to a creditor's claim. Nor does the husband's

97. Id. at 639, 450 S.E.2d at 819.
98. O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22 (1991).
99. 264 Ga. at 639, 450 S.E.2d at 820.
100. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 819.
101. Id. at 639-40, 450 S.E.2d at 820.
102. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-28 (1995).
103. 264 Ga. at 640, 450 S.E.2d at 820.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-3 (1995)).
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power to appoint, subject the trust property to claims of his creditors. 10 8 He had only a restricted power during his life. The husband
could appoint his interest to his wife's heirs and, at his death, the trust
property was devised to those heirs as he determined. Thus, his creditor
has no present right against the trust principal or income and will have
none at the husband's death."
E.

Will Construction

Succession Rights of a Child Born out of Wedlock. Whether a
child born out of wedlock should take as one of the "children" of the
natural father under the father's testamentary trust for the benefit of
his wife and children was the crucial issue in Sardy v. Hodge."0 The
testator's will was executed in 1981 and admitted to probate after his
death in 1983. In 1992, almost nine years thereafter, the child filed an
action for determination of the heirs at law, claiming the right to share
as one of the children and seeking exhumation of the father's body for
DNA testing to prove the fact of paternity."'
During the years between execution of the will and the death of the
testator, the statute on the inheritance rights of children born out of
wedlock went through several changes." 2 The law in effect at his
death provided that such a child could inherit from his natural father
only if, during the lifetime of the father, the child had been declared
legitimate by a court of competent jurisdiction or if the paternity of the
putative father had been established by a court order."' In 1991, the
cited section was amended to provide additional conditions under which
a child born out of wedlock may inherit from or through his natural
father."" One of these conditions requires a genetic testing establishing a ninety-seven percent probability of paternity not rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence." 5 This amendment was the basis of the
6
plaintiff's request for exhumation for DNA testing.
The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor
of the estate. A will is to be construed according to the law in effect at

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 264 Ga. 548, 448 S.E.2d 355 (1994).
111. Id. at 549, 448 S.E.2d at 356.
112. Id.
113. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-904(c) (Harrison 1980) (currently codified at O.C.G.A. § 53-44(c)).

114. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(c) (1995).
115. 264 Ga. at 549, 448 S.E.2d at 356.
116. Id.

1995]

WILLS AND TRUSTS

401

a testator's death. 17 A statutory change in the law of succession eight
years after his death will not benefit the plaintiff." 8 The 1991 amendment had no retroactive effect." 9
Devolution of Lapsed Legacy. The lapse problem that arose in
Tumlin v. Butler 2 ' was complicated by the fact ' that the lapsed
bequest was a part of the residue. The will provided that all of the
residue of the estate (consisting entirely of personalty), "including any
lapsed or void legacies,"' 2 ' be divided, one-fourth in trust for testatrix's
brother John if he survived her, and the remaining three-fourths to be
divided equally among fourteen named nephews and nieces or their
descendants. With reference to the one-fourth in trust for John, the will
provided that if he predeceased the testatrix it would pass equally
to the
122
fourteen named nephews and nieces who were then living.
John predeceased the testatrix and after her death, a nephew who was
not named in the will, argued that there was a lapse as to the one-fourth
of the residue that would have been in trust for John. The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of
the executor.

2

1

There was a lapse of the bequest to John, 2 4 but

under the Georgia statute a lapsed legacy of personalty "shall fall into
the residuum and go to the residuary legatee." 2 5 Case authority mandates that this result follows even where the lapsed personalty was
given in a residuary clause. 26 Under this authority the
lapsed share
7
of the residue passed to the fourteen residuary takers.'
Powers of Appointment. Never is careful draftsmanship more
important than in the creation and the exercise of a testamentary power
of appointment. This year's object lesson in this regard is the case of
Shields v. Shields. 8 In Shields, the testator, in Item 3 of his will, left
his entire estate to his wife for life or widowhood and also gave her, "the
right to do anything in reference thereto, that she may deem proper,

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. (citing Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343, 232 S.E.2d 835 (1977)).
Id. at 550, 448 S.E.2d at 356.
O.C.G.A. § 1-3-5 (1995).
264 Ga. 488, 448 S.E.2d 198 (1994).
Id. at 488, 448 S.E.2d at 199.
Id.
Id. at 488-89, 448 S.E.2d at 199.

124. Id. at 489, 448 S.E.2d at 199.
125. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-104(a) (1995).
126. 264 Ga. at 489, 448 S.E.2d at 199 (citing McNeely v. McNeely, 228 Ga. 418, 186
S.E.2d 105 (1971)).

127.

Id.

128.

264 Ga. 559, 448 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
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without order of court and without the consent of, control or interference
with her by any other person ...

without any liability to any other

person, for waste or mismanagement."129 The next item of the will left
all proceeds from the sale of property not disposed of by the wife and not
used by her "under the provisions of Item 3 of this will" to his five
named children." After the testator's death in 1978, the wife continued to live on the hundred-acre farm until 1984. She then moved in
with one of the sons, where she resided until her death in 1989. During
this period, in 1986, she conveyed the farm, in fee, to that son and his
wife. 131
The other children sought a declaration that the wife conveyed only
her life estate in the farm, and not the fee, because the language of the
will was too ambiguous to support a holding that she conveyed the fee.
The supreme court, though, affirmed a summary judgment that the
conveyance transferred the fee. While an express grant of a life estate
with an added power of disposal does not enlarge the life estate into a
fee,'32 the power is construed as a power to convey the fee unless it 1is
33
expressly, or by necessary implication, limited to the smaller estate.
While the two items of the will did not expressly say that the power was
one to convey the fee, the majority was prompted to quote the following
language from Townsley v. Townsley: ' "It is difficult to conceive of
language that would express a more clear intent to give a wife during
her lifetime complete control and power of disposal of the property
devised
under the terms of the will than that here used by the testa" 13 5
tor.

The two dissenting justices disagreed with the majority's construction
of Townsley, pointing to the fact that in that case and in numerous other
Georgia cases, the life tenant was specifically given the right to sell,
while in Shields there was no such specific language."'6 This sharp
disagreement within the court is a commentary on the importance of
precise draftsmanship when dealing with powers of appointment.

129. Id. at 560, 448 S.E.2d at 437.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 561, 448 S.E.2d at 437 (citing Osborn v. Morrison, 219 Ga. 169, 132 S.E.2d
58 (1963)).
133. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-258 (1995).
134. 209 Ga. 323, 72 S.E.2d 289 (1994).
135. 264 Ga. at 561, 448 S.E.2d at 438 (quoting 209 Ga. at 325, 72 S.E.2d at 289)).
136. Id. at 562, 448 S.E.2d at 438.
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LEGISLATION

While there was little substantive legislative activity in the field of
fiduciary law, the readers of this paper are alerted to a couple of statutes
which tangentially relate to the subject. These are mentioned here only
by way of brief reference.
A.

Guardianand Ward
The guardianship title of the Official Code of Georgia13 7 was extensively revised to provide more specific guidance as to the appointment
and qualification of guardians and as to their power to compromise
claims in favor of the ward. 3 8

B.

Power of Attorney
One of the newer of the uniform laws approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is the Uniform
Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act, which was approved by the
conference in 1988.'
This expansion of the law of agency opens up
new opportunities for lifetime estate planning. The statutory form lists
thirteen broad types of powers which together would give the donee of
the power all the authority which the donor himself possessed with
reference to his financial affairs. 40 Flexibility is built into the process
by the statutory checklist of powers, any of which the donor could grant
by initialing in the space at the end of the particular power or could
withhold by not so initialing in the space. The statute expressly states
that the form "may be used to create a financial power of attorney but
is not the exclusive method for creating such an agency." "
III.

CONCLUSION

The judicial decisions and the legislative action deemed worthy of
mention in this paper remind us, again, of the broad scope and the
detailed application of legal principles in this body of law called
"fiduciary law."

137. O.C.G.A. tit. 29 (1993).
138. O.C.G.A. tit. 29 (Supp. 1995).
139. Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act (U.L.A.) (1988).

140. O.C.G.A. § 10-6-142 (1995).
141.

Id. § 10-6-140.

